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CHAPTER 5 
Corporations and Partnerships 
CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN 
§5.I. Corporate opportunity doctrine. In the brief span of a single 
SURVEY year startling developments and new departures are hardly to 
be expected in the law of business associations. More . likely, the de-
cisions will reflect a refinement of doctrine and the application of 
established principles to new fact situations. But growth and expan-
sion of particular rules of law can be observed within the confines of 
specific cases. We may take as an example the doctrine of corporate 
opportunity. This doctrine, derived from the fiduciary nature of a 
director's duty to his corporation, forbids a director to take for his 
own benefit a business opportunity, a contract or a property interest 
that in fairness should be made available to the corporation. The 
doctrine is designed to insure the integrity of corporate management 
and to resolve a conflict of interest in favor of the corporation. Never-
theless, in a case decided in 1941, Lincoln Stores v. Grant,! the Su-
preme Judicial Court not only refused to apply the doctrine to a fact 
situation that strongly justified its invocation but cautiously stated 
that 
the legal restrictions that rest upon officers in their acqulSltlOnS 
are generally limited to property in which the corporation has an 
interest already existing, or in which it has an expectancy growing 
out of an existing right, or to cases where the officers' interference 
will, in some degree, prevent or hinder the corporation in effect-
ing the purposes of its creation.2 
This narrow statement of the doctrine was later repudiated in Dur-
fee v. DUrfee & Canning, Inc.,s and "the true basis of the governing 
doctrine" was held to rest "fundamentally on the unfairness in the 
particular circumstances of a director, whose relation to the corpo-
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ration is fiduciary 'taking advantage of an opportunity (for his per-
sonal profit) when the interest of the corporation justly calls for pro-
tection.' "4 This broad statement of the rule has since been followed, 
and the Durfee case has become a precedent for increasingly frequent 
applications of the doctrine. In the 1962 SURVEY year, two cases, one 
federal and one state, dealt with the doctrine. 
In W. H. Elliott & Sons Co. v. Gotthardt 5 a corporate creditor com-
plained of a transaction in which a director allegedly diverted a busi-
ness opportunity from his corporation to another corporation in breach 
of his fiduciary duty. According to the allegations of the complaint, 
two of the directors of the debtor corporation caused a new corpo-
ration to be organized for the purpose of acquiring land and buildings 
adjacent to the plant of the debtor corporation. A portion of this 
land was afterward leased to the debtor corporation, which needed 
additional warehouse space. In granting a motion for summary judg-
ment the trial judge had ruled that "under the law of Massachusetts 
the acquisition of property, to constitute an interference with a corpo-
rate opportunity, 'must be not only within the corporate purpose but 
also highly desirable if not absolutely necessary.''' Oddly enough, 
Durfee v. Durfee & Canning} Inc. was cited as authority for this propo-
sition. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit cor-
rectly pointed out that the rule laid down in Durfee was not so nar-
rowly limited. It further ruled that the asserted financial inability 
of the corporation to acquire the property did not relieve the directors 
of their duty to the corporation. 
In Wilson v. ]ennings6 shareholders complained in a derivative suit 
that a manufacturing contract which the controlling director caused 
the corporation to enter into with a second corporation in which such 
director became a 50 percent shareholder as well as director violated 
the fiduciary duties owed by the director. The Supreme Judicial 
Court upheld a decree declaring the contract void and imposing a 
constructive trust on the shares acquired by the defendant director 
in the second corporation. The basis for the relief granted was the 
taking by the director for his own benefit of an advantageous oppor-
tunity which belonged to the corporation. Again the Durfee case was 
relied on as authority for the conclusion reached. 
§5.2. Derivative suits: Joinder of corporate and individual causes 
of action. In a shareholder's derivative suit the plaintiff is necessarily 
asserting a claim belonging to the corporation. In substance the cor-
poration is the plaintiff, and the shareholder merely sets the judicial 
machinery in motion to enforce a corporate cause of action. If the 
plaintiff shareholder combines in a single suit both a corporate and 
an individual cause of action, the two causes of action are in legal 
theory unconnected and the objection may be made that the bill is 
4 The Court's quotation is from Ballantine, Corporations 204·205 (rev. 00. 1946). 
II 305 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1962). 
61962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1107, 184 N.E.2d 642. 
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multifarious. 1 The claim of multifariousness was urged as a ground 
of demurrer in Wilson v. Jennings2 to the bill in the derivative suit 
in that case. In addition to allegations of breach of fiduciary duty 
by the individual defendants as directors (consisting of obtaining an 
unfair long-term employment contract from the corporation and the 
seizure for themselves of a corporate opportunity) the bill alleged that 
two of the defendant directors caused additional shares to be issued 
to themselves at a price below the fair market value for the purpose 
of wresting corporate control from the plaintiffs. To the extent that 
the issuance prices of these shares were below their actual value, there 
was an injury to the corporation. But if the additional shares were 
issued for the purpose of diluting the plaintiffs' voting power, it was 
a private wrong to the plaintiffs.3 In rejecting the argument of 
multifariousness, the Court stated that the various issues were closely 
interrelated and based upon the same transactions. This represents 
a realistic approach to the issue of multifariousness.4 
The litigation in Wilson v. Jennings in fact involved two suits: one 
a derivative suit brought in Suffolk County, the other an individual 
suit by the same shareholders brought in Middlesex County. The 
directors of the corporation were defendants in both suits. Both cases 
were consolidated for trial, and the appeals were heard on a consoli-
dated record. Some, although not all, of the factual issues were com-
mon to both cases but the legal principles underlying the plaintiffs' 
right to relief in each case were different. There is a risk in such a 
situation of confusion of issues, and such confusion did occur. The 
trial judge's findings of fact failed to distinguish between the duties 
owed by directors to the corporation and those owed to the plaintiffs 
individually by reason of a pre-incorporation contract. As a conse-
quence, the final decree in the derivative suit went beyond the scope 
of the pleadings in that case.1I Specifically, the decree adjudged that 
§5.2. 1 In Whitney v. Whitney, 296 Mass. Ill, 4 N.E.2d 438 (1936), the bill, brought 
by a shareholder against the majority shareholder and the corporation, alleged that 
the individual defendant had misappropriated corporate assets and also that he 
had wrongfully caused the issuance of additional shares to himself. A demurrer 
to the bill on the ground of multifariousness was sustained. The Court was con-
tent to state: "Joining these two unconnected causes of suit in one bill made it 
multifarious." The improper issuance of shares to the individual defendant was 
held to be a wrong to the plaintiff and not to the corporation. Cf. Andersen v. 
Albert Be J. M. Anderson Manufacturing Co., 325 Mass. 343, 90 N.E.2d 541 (1950). 
2 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1107, 184 N.E.2d 642. 
3 L. E. Fosgate Co. v. Boston Market Terminal Co., 275 Mass. 99, 175 N.E. 86 
(1931); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953). 
4 The criterion for determining whether a bill is multifarious was well stated 
by Lummus, J., in Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597, 610, 29 N.E.2d 140, 148·149 
(1940): "The objection that a bill is multifarious is not one to be determined ac· 
cording to formal or crystallized rules. It is addressed to the practical wisdom of 
the court, which must consider whether the bill raises issues too diverse and com· 
plex to be dealt with in a single proceeding efficiently and with fairness to the 
defendants." . 
II Since the allegations of the bill in each suit are not set forth in the Court's 
opinion, the discrepancy between bill and decree appears only from an examina· 
tion of the record. See Record, pp. 2·13, 406·408. 
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the employment contract obtained by the principal defendant, Jen-
nings, from the corporation was void and of no effect. On appeal this 
portion of the decree was affirmed on the ground that it violated the 
pre-incorporation agreement between Jennings and the plaintiff. Yet 
the bill of complaint in the derivative suit did not, and perhaps 
properly could not, allege a pre-incorporation contract between the 
promoters. 
§5.3. Derivative suits: Allowance of counsel fees. It is well settled 
that the successful plaintiff in a derivative suit is normally entitled 
to an allowance for counsel fees and expenses to be paid by the corpo-
ration out of the funds recovered by it from the defendant. The basis 
for this allowance has been said to be "that an expense incurred by 
one, resulting in the creation of a fund for the general benefit of many 
other persons, ought not to be borne entirely by the one whose action 
has resulted in the realization of such a fund, and that it is equitable 
that a part of the expense should be paid out of the fund." 1 Even if 
no fund is recovered out of which payment may be made, reimburse-
ment is allowed by most courts when the litigation has benefited the 
corporation, as by the setting aside of an unfavorable contract.2 
The award of counsel fees in Wilson v. ]ennings3 was unusual in 
two respects. The decree in the derivative suit, instead of ordering 
an allowance of counsel fees to the plaintiff to be paid by the corpo-
ration, ordered the principal defendant, Jennings, and his wife (also 
a defendant) to pay to the corporation $5000 "for costs and expenses 
and counsel fees incurred by Poly top Corporation." On appeal this 
portion of the decree was, in substance, affirmed. There would seem 
to be no precedent for such a decree. The cases cited in support" 
merely followed the usual practice of granting to the plaintiff an al-
lowance for counsel fees to be paid out of the fund recovered by the 
corporation. But the decree in Wilson compelled the individual de-
fendants to pay the counsel fees of the corporation, and presumably 
of the plaintiffs, thus departing from the basic rule that each party 
to litigation must bear his own expehse for counsel fees. 
In the second suit involved in Wilson, the decree ordered Jennings 
and his wife to pay $1000 to the corporation for its counsel fees and 
expenses. This decree was also upheld in substance on appeal. Again, 
there would seem to be no precedent for such a decree. In the second 
suit the plaintiffs were suing on an individual cause of suit to enforce 
their personal rights. Only the normal costs as between party and 
party but not counsel fees are allowable in this type of litigation.1i 
§5.3. 1 Shaw v. Harding, 306 Mass. 441, 450, 28 N.E.2d 469, 474 (1940). 
2 See, e.g., Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957); Richman v. DeVai 
Aerodynamics, Inc., 185 A.2d 884 (Del. Ch. 1962). Cf. Shaw v. Harding, 306 Mass. 
441,28 N.E.2d 469 (1940). 
3 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1107, 184 N.E.2d 642. 
"Sagalyn v. Meekins, Packard Be Wheat Inc., 290 Mass. 434, 195 N.E. 769 (1955); 
Samia v. Central Oil Co. of Worcester, 359 Mass. 101, 158 N.E.2d 469 (1959), noted 
in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§5.3, 5.4, 5.5. 
Ii Commissioner of Insurance v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 51,8 Mass. 258, 61 
N.E.2d 157 (1945); Sarner v. Sarner, 58 N.J. 465, 185 A.2d 851 (1962). 
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§5.4. Close corporations: Pre-incorporation shareholder agree-
ments. Persons intending to organize a close corporation l often desire 
that their interests as participants in the enterprise be governed other 
than by the corporate norms regulating the rights of shareholders. 
What they contemplate may be loosely described as an incorporated 
partnership - a corporate entity which shields the shareholders from 
liability for debts of the enterprise with the rights and obligations of 
the members inter se being subject to the strict fiduciary relationship 
of partners. In some but not all jurisdictions a pre-incorporation 
contract among the organizers specifying their rights as shareholders 
is held to survive the coming into existence of the corporation and to 
determine the internal relations of the shareholders. In those juris-
dictions which recognize such an agreement as continuing to control 
the relations of the parties, the pre-incorporation contract becomes an 
effective device to prevent a squeeze-out of a minority shareholder.2 
But even a majority shareholder may find that this type of arrange-
ment affords him protection when he has unwarily permitted the 
minority to gain control of the board of directors. 
In Wilson v. ]ennings8 the dominant position of the majority share-
holders was threatened when the minority shareholder, who controlled 
the board of directors, caused additional shares of stock to be issued 
to himself. A pre-incorporation contract among the parties enabled 
the majority to preserve the balance of power. The corporation was 
organized by the two plaintiffs and the defendant Jennings. Ten 
shares of stock were issued to each of the organizers. The three par-
ties, it was found by the trial judge, "agreed to be equal one-third 
owners of ... Poly top ... with the stock ownership to be divided 
equally." Subsequently, the defendant Jennings negotiated a sixteen-
year employment contract with the corporation at a specified salary 
plus commissions. Under the terms of this contract Jennings had the 
privilege of converting any indebtedness of the corporation to him 
into voting stock at the rate of one share for each $1000 of debt. Jen-
nings later caused an additional thirty shares of stock to be issued to 
himself by exercising the conversion privilege pursuant to the con-
tract. This employment contract was not disclosed to the plaintiffs 
until after the defendant had converted his debt into stock. 
The Court struck down the employment contract on the ground that 
it violated the pre-incorporation agreement between the incorpo-
§5.4. 1 The term "close corporation" has no precise definition. It is used with 
reference to a corporation having a small number of stockholders, the shares of the 
corporation not being registered on a stock exchange or regularly traded in an 
over-the-counter market; commonly, the shareholders, or a majority of them, are 
corporate directors and officers. The term has no reference to the financial size 
of the corporation. See I O'Neal, Close Corporations §§1.02. l.07 (1958). 
2 Various devices may be used by the control group to squeeze out a minority: 
merger, consolidation, sale of assets. issuance of additional shares. withholding of 
dividends, or denial of corporate office and employment. See Note, Freezing Out 
Minority Shareholders, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 16110 (1961). 
81962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1107, 184 N.E.2d 642. 
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rators. As to this agreement the Court held that the trial judge could 
find on the evidence that the parties "on an informal and somewhat 
ambiguous basis had entered into what was essentially a joint venture 
in corporate form to exploit the plastic top invention"; that there was 
a mutual understanding that the parties would keep one another in-
formed of their activities; that the three-way equal division of stock 
was to be permanent; and that the relationship was to be one of trust 
and confidence.4 The employment contract, the Court concluded, was 
executed in breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure owed by the 
defendant Jennings, and the provision in the contract for the conver-
sion of debt into stock violated the understanding that there would 
be an equal division of stock in the corporation. 
Where the parties, prior to incorporation, have been carrying on a 
joint venture and then decide to incorporate the undertaking, their 
understanding that their relations should continue to be governed by 
the rules controlling joint ventures should be given effect.5 So also, 
where the organizers of a corporation have clearly expressed their in-
tention in a pre-incorporation agreement that their internal relations 
shall be regulated by the agreement rather than by corporate norms, 
the contract should be treated as valid.6 It may be doubted, however, 
whether an informal and ambiguous understanding between the par-
ticipants justifies a deviation from the corporate norms regulating the 
rights of shareholders. 
§5.5. Derivative suits: Form of demand on shareholders. It is the 
established rule in many jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, that 
before commencing a derivative suit, the plaintiff shareholder must 
first make a demand on the board of directors to take action with 
reference to the matters complained Of,l and if such demand is refused, 
make application to the body of shareholders except when a major-
ity of the directors and of the shareholders are themselves the wrong-
doers or acting in collusion with them.2 Since this requirement of 
exhaustion of remedies within the corporation is a condition precedent 
to the plaintiff's right to maintain the suit, he must in his pleading 
41962 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1111-1112, 184 N.E.2d at 646. It is not clear that the 
trial judge did in fact make such findings. His "Findings of Fact, Rulings of Law 
and Order for Decree" were a confusing mixture of ambiguous factual findings and 
erroneous conclusions of law. See Record, pp. 401-405. 
5 Wabash Railroad Co. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 F.2d 1I115 (8th Cir. 
1925); Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d 1I54, 11I6 P.2d 651 (19411); Latimer v. 
Piper, 261 Mich. 12/l, 246 N.W. 65 (19/l/l); Mendelsohn v .. Leather Manufacturing 
Corp., 1I26 Mass. 226, 9/l N.E.2d 537 (1950). Contra: Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.]. Eq. 
592, 75 Atl. 568 (1910); Weisman v. Awnair Corp. of America, /l N.Y.2d 444, 144 
N.E.2d 415 (1957). 
6 Moss v. Waytz, 4 111. App. 2d 296, 124 N.E.2d 91 (1955); DeBoy v. Harris, 207 
Md. 212, 1111 A.2d 901l (1955); Sher v. Sandler, /l25 Mass. 348, 90 N.E.2d 536 (1950). 
§5.5. 1 Bartlett v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 221 Mass. 5/l0, 
109 N.E. 452 (1915); Brewer v. Boston Theatre, 104 Mass. 378 (1870). 
2 S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., /l26 
Mass. 99, 9lJ N.E.2d 241 (1950); Pomerantz ,v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. !l41 (D. Mass. 
1951). 
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specify what efforts he has made to obtain action by the directors and 
stockholders or allege facts showing an adequate reason for his failure 
to do so.S 
The demand on the board of directors will normally consist of a 
request that the board institute proceedings to enforce the corpora-
tion's cause of action against the wrongdoers.4 The nature of the 
demand that must be made on the shareholders has received little at-
tention from the courts.5 This question was presented in Halprin v. 
Babbitt,6 and the court held that the form of the demand should be 
a request that the shareholders cause proceedings to be instituted 
against the wrongdoers. The court stated that there are two purposes 
for this: "The first is to permit the majority to take some sort of af-
firmative action itself. The second is to permit the majority to decide 
... that no action be taken by anybody." 7 If the majority fails to 
act at all, the court held, the minority shareholder may proceed with 
a derivative suit. No express authorization from the majority to in-
stitute the suit is necessary. 
§5.6. Corporations: Remedies of corporate creditors against direc-
tors. When directors of a corporation commit a breach of their 
fiduciary duty to the corporation it is clear that they can be held ac-
countable to the corporation either in a direct proceeding by the cor-
poration itself or in a shareholder's derivative suit. In some situations 
the breach of duty by the directors may also cause indirectly an injury 
to corporate creditors. The remedies available to the creditors in such 
circumstances are not wholly clear. This problem arose, but was not 
decided, in W. H. Elliott 6- Sons Co. v. Gotthardt.1 
8 In Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. at 344, it was said by Wyzanski, J.: "The 
fundamental basis of the rule is the Massachusetts view that neither an individual 
member nor a court is usually best fitted to determine whether it is to the in-
terest of a corporation publicly to enforce corporate claims even if those claims 
are founded on plainly unlawful conduct participated in by corporate officers 
or directors. A disinterested internal organ of the corporation has the advantage 
of familiarity with the enterprise, with those who have conducted it and with the 
record of success or failure." An allegation in the complaint that the majority 
shareholders have "refused" to institute an action is not, without more, sufficient. 
"The fact that the majority had 'refused' to sue may merely mean a passive failure 
to act. It does not import receipt and rejection of a demand, or constitute an ex-
cuse for failure to make one." Halprin v. Babbitt, 303 F.2d 138, 140 (1st Cir. 1962). 
4 Bartlett v. New York, New Haven Be Hartford R.R. Co., 221 Mass. 530, 109 
N.E. 452 (1915). 
I> See Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a De-
rivative Suit, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 746, 749·750 (1960). 
6303 F.2d 138, 141 (1st Cir. 1962). The court also stated that a demand by the 
plaintiff shareholder merely requesting permission to proceed by himself at his own 
expense would not be sufficient. As to the "affirmative action" available to the share-
holders as a body, conceivably the shareholders could instruct the board of directors 
(if there is a disinterested majority) to sue the wrongdoers, or remove the wrong· 
doing directors for cause and elect their successors, or decide to bring a derivative 
suit in behalf of the majority. 
7303 F.2d at l4l. 
§5.6. 1 305 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1962). 
7
Moynihan: Chapter 5: Corporations and Partnerships
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1962
§5.6 CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 65 
In that case the plaintiff was a judgment creditor of King Company, 
a Massachusetts corporation. His complaint alleged that during the 
pendency of the litigation which resulted in the judgment for the 
plaintiff the assets of King Company available for satisfaction of 
the judgment were substantially reduced by the conduct of the direc-
tors of King Company; that this conduct consisted of the diversion of 
a business opportunity from the King Company to a new corporation 
organized by the directors, and of the transfer of assets of King Com-
pany for the purpose of putting them beyond the reach of creditors. 
The relief requested by the plaintiff was that the directors should be 
required to account to the plaintiff for the alleged diversion of prop-
erty, business opportunity and profits, and to the extent that the in-
dividual defendants had prejudiced the plaintiff's ability to satisfy its 
judgment against King Company they should be held "directly liable 
to this plaintiff for the damage thus resulting." The plaintiff de-
manded judgment for monetary damages against King Company, its 
directors and officers. The trial judge granted summary judgment in 
favor of two of the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed the judgment as to the defendant Frothingham and reversed 
as to the defendant Gotthardt. Frothingham was sales manager of a 
division of the corporation, and clerk of the corporation. He was let 
out on the ground that: 
The Massachusetts cases with regard to the liability of corporate 
directors and officers to creditors for breach of their fiduciary obli-
gation to creditors, or to the corporation itself, make it clear that 
the court has imposed liability only on corporate directors and 
major corporate officers.2 
Frothingham had not been active in or consulted on corporate policy 
matters and as clerk was not liable for any breach of duty. But the 
defendant Gotthardt was vice-president and a director of the corpo-
ration and concerning him it was held that the record presented a fact 
question as to whether he, as a director, had participated in usurping 
a corporate opportunity "for which he may be responsible to the credi-
tors of King Company." 3 It was further held that it was a question 
of fact whether the transfer of assets of King Company to a newly 
organized corporation in which Gotthardt and Frothingham acquired 
a 40 percent stock interest did involve a violation of Gotthardt's fidu-
ciary duties as director. 
The plaintiff seems to have pitched its case on the theory that mis-
conduct on the part of corporate directors and officers gives rise to 
a direct liability to corporate creditors. There is little in the cases to 
support this view. The ·duties imposed on directors are duties owing 
to the corporation itself. If a director is guilty of a breach of the duty 
of care or of loyalty to the corporation, there is a corporate cause of 
action for such breach and this cause of action is a corporate asset 
2305 F.2d at 545. 
a 305 F.2d at 547. 
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available to a corporate creditor by a bill to reach and apply. Normally, 
the creditor has no direct cause of action against the director.4o There 
would seem to be little, if any, justification for imposing on a director 
a fiduciary duty with respect to corporate creditors. Such a concept 
imports a relation of trust and confidence involving a duty of loyalty 
and a high degree of good faith. There is to be found in some of the 
cases the statement that a director is "to some extent" a trustee of the 
corporate property for creditors, but these cases involve an improper 
distribution of assets to shareholders5 or the obtaining of a preference 
by the director when the corporation is, or is about to become, in-
solvent.6 A statement of this nature really means that a director will 
not be allowed to deal unfairly with the corporate property at the 
expense of creditors. 
In Elliott the issue as to the appropriate relief available to the 
plaintiff was not before the Court of Appeals. Assuming that the 
defendant Gotthardt participated in the usurpation of a corporate 
opportunity and the improper diversion of corporate assets, the plain-
tiff judgment creditor could reach and apply the debtor corporation's 
cause of action against that director, and could also have set aside 
any fraudulent conveyance of corporate assets. Since the pleadings 
and affidavits raised questions of fact as to Gotthardt's breach of duty 
to the corporation, the latter's motion for summary judgment was 
properly denied. 
§5.7. Limited partnership: Right of limited partner to rescind for 
fraud. When a partner in an ordinary partnership has been induced 
to become a member of the firm by reason of fraud or misrepresenta-
tion by his associates, his right to rescind the contract of partnership 
and to recover his contribution to the capital is subject to the prior 
right of firm creditors to payment of the obligations owing to them. 
The express provisions of Section 39 of the Uniform Partnership Actl 
to this effect are declaratory of the common law rule.2 On the ques-
tion of the right of a limited partner to rescind for fraud and to re-
capture his capital contribution after the insolvency of the limited 
partnership, the answer is none too clear. The Uniform Limited Part-
nership Acta has no provision parallel to Section 39 of the Uniform 
Partnership Act and there seem to have been no cases on the point. 
This problem arose in Securities and Exchange Commission v. 
4 Young v. Haviland, 215 Mass. 120, 102 N.E. 338 (1913); Allen v. Cochran, 160 La. 
425, 107 So. 292 (1926). See Ballantine, Corporations 185-186 (rev. ed. 1946). Stat-
utes are to be found in many states imposing liability on directors to creditors for 
specific acts. See, e.g., G.L., c. 156, §36 (illegal stock issuance, executing false reports 
of condition); §37 (illegal dividends and loans to directors or shareholders). 
5 Seder v. Gibbs, 333 Mass. 445, 131 N.E.2d 376 (1956); Burke v. Marlboro Awning 
Co., 330 Mass. 294, 113 N.E.2d 222 (1953). 
6 Albert Richards Co. v. The Mayfair, Inc., 287 Mass. 280, 191 N.E. 430 (1934). 
§5.7. 1 G.L., c. 108A. 
2 Grossman v. Lewis, 226 Mass. 163, 115 N.E. 236 (1917). 
3 G.L., c. 109. 
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duPont, Homsey & CO.,4 and it was held that the defrauded limited 
partner's right to recover his capital contribution out of the assets of 
the insolvent limited partnership was subject to the prior rights of 
third persons to have their claims satisfied. The court reached this 
result by applying Section 39 of the Uniform Partnership Act and 
invoked the language of Section 6(2) of the Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act in support. Ii The latter section recites that the Uniform 
Partnership Act "shall apply to limited partnerships except in so far 
as the statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsistent herewith." 
It is open to some doubt, however, whether the right of a limited 
partner to rescind the limited partnership contract for fraud is subject 
to the same statutory provisions as those governing a general partner. 
Unfortunately, the adoption of the term "limited partner" has helped 
to create the impression that a limited partner is only a special type 
of partner.6 Actually, he is a member of the association who has made 
an investment in the enterprise.7 His status is more analogous to that 
of a shareholder in a corporation than that of a general partner. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion reached by the court would seem to be 
sound. Normally, the owners of an enterprise will not be allowed 
to compete with creditors in the distribution of the assets of the busi-
ness. And, despite some diversity of opinion, by the weight of author-
ity a shareholder in a corporation will not be allowed to rescind his 
stock subscription after corporate insolvency against subsequent credi-
tors of the corporation.8 
4204 F. Supp. 944 (D. Mass. 1962). 
Ii G.L., c. 10SA, §6(2). 
6 The Commissioners' Note to Section 1 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act 
states: "In the draft [of the act] the person who contributes the capital, though 
in accordance with custom called a limited partner, is not in any sense a partner. 
He is, however, a member of the association." 8 U.L.A. 4 (1922). 
7 "A limited partnership is simply a matter of investment." P1asteel Products 
Corp. v. Eisenberg, 170 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Mass. 1959), afJ'd sub nom. Plasteel 
Products Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959), noted in 1960 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §5.6. 
8 See, e.g., Commissioner of Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 253 Mass. 205, 148 
N.E. 609 (1925); Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 Pac. 977, 46 A.L.R. 666 
(1926); Ballantine, Corporations 785·788 (rev. ed. 1946). 
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